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INTRODUCTION
Can a school discipline a student for creating a vulgar parody profile of
the school principal or another student on the website MySpace? Can it
preclude a student from wearing at school a T-shirt that reads,
―Homosexuality is shameful‖? These are some of the difficult issues raised
when students‘ First Amendment rights clash with schools‘ operational
needs and custodial responsibilities.
The Supreme Court has addressed students‘ First Amendment speech
rights on several occasions, most recently in Morse v. Frederick.1 Lower
courts, however, have had great difficulty applying these precedents,
particularly when the speech involves the Internet or other new media.2 For
example, two courts of appeals from the same circuit reached different
decisions in Internet-related student speech cases on very similar facts.3
Consequently, student speech cases are among the most commonly
litigated cases under the First Amendment, dwarfing the number of cases
dealing with ―obscenity, indecency, incitement to or advocacy of unlawful
activity, defamation, commercial advertising, [and] campaign finance.‖4
Several commentators have attributed the plethora of lower court cases
and inconsistent results to a lack of direction from the Supreme Court.5
The criticism of Morse in this regard has been especially harsh.6 Although
1. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). For a discussion of the cases, see Part I.A.
2. The Supreme Court cases all involved traditional media and speech that occurred under
school supervision. See Part I.A.
3. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 308 (3d Cir.
2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9, 2010) (suspension did not violate student‘s First Amendment rights), with Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 249, 263 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated,
No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010) (suspension violated student‘s
First Amendment rights).
4. Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP.
CT. REV. 205, 208. Given the reluctance of students and parents to incur the costs of litigation for
suspensions that often are served before they can be effectively reviewed, the number of litigated
cases vastly underestimates the number of student speech controversies. Id. at 225–26; see also
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
5. See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation
of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 837 (2008); Benjamin F. Heidlage, Note, A
Relational Approach to Schools‟ Regulation of Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 572, 576,
579 (2009); Abby Marie Mollen, Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of
Controversial School Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2008).
6. See, e.g., Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 837; Schauer, supra note 4, at 209–10; The
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the Court‘s precedents are not unambiguous, this Article suggests that the
difficulty in the area results primarily from lower courts‘ fundamental
misunderstanding of the Supreme Court‘s opinions.
Rather than critique individual lower court decisions, this Article
presents a comprehensive approach to student speech cases applicable to
both traditional and new media.7 The Article argues that student speech
should be treated differently depending upon whether the speech occurs
under school supervision.8 In particular, student speech outside school
supervision should receive the same First Amendment protection accorded
non-students in parallel settings. Student speech under school supervision
may be disciplined if it is lewd, advocates illegal action, can be deemed
school-sponsored speech, or can reasonably be predicted to cause a
substantial disruption to the school‘s activities. Moreover, school officials‘
disciplinary decisions regarding on-campus student speech should be given
great deference, particularly if not viewpoint-based.
Part I of this Article reviews the Supreme Court‘s student speech cases
and the general interpretation of those cases by lower courts. Part II.A
reviews the special characteristics of the school environment that
necessitate special First Amendment rules. Part II.B then explains why offcampus student speech should receive full First Amendment protection,
provides case support for that conclusion, and addresses the special cases
of student threats and cyberbullying9 that arise off campus. Part II.C
Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 181, 296 (2007).
7. This Article addresses student speech at public primary and secondary schools only.
Private schools, by definition, are not government run and, therefore, are not subject to the demands
of the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Most undergraduate or graduate students are older,
less impressionable, not as vulnerable, and better able to make and evaluate contributions to the
―marketplace of ideas‖ than primary and secondary students. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist.
No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of
Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 877–79 (2008). Also, college students often live on campus, making
speech outside school supervision less readily available, and are not subject to mandatory
attendance laws. Accordingly, courts have indicated that college administrators are entitled to less
discretion in formulating and applying restrictions on student speech than officials at primary and
secondary schools. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3d Cir. 2008); O‘Neal v.
Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. SA-08-CA-1031-XR, 2010 WL 376602, at *13–14 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
27, 2010). This is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s recognition that the constitutional rights of
minors and adults are not the same. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S.
Ct. 2633, 2639, 2640 n.1 (2009) (Fourth Amendment); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05
(2007) (First Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70, 578–79 (2005) (Eighth
Amendment).
8. This Article uses ―speech under school supervision‖ and ―on-campus speech‖
interchangeably for easier reading. Both indicate speech where the student is under the supervisory
authority or control of the school. To be under school supervision, the student does not have to be
literally on campus. For example, speech during school trips or school-sponsored activities is
considered on campus. ―Speech outside school supervision‖ and ―off-campus speech‖ also are used
interchangeably.
9. Cyberbullying refers to the ―‗use of the Internet, cell phones, or other technology to send
or post text or images intended to hurt or embarrass another person.‘‖ Jessica Moy, Note, Beyond
„The Schoolhouse Gates‟ and into the Virtual Playground: Moderating Student Cyberbullying and
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describes the proper approach to on-campus student speech cases. The
Supreme Court cases, all involving on-campus speech, necessarily control.
While this Part does not present a unique standard for evaluating oncampus speech, it enumerates some factors that courts should consider
when applying that standard, guidance that is missing from most decisions
in the area. Part II concludes with a section suggesting how to distinguish
on-campus from off-campus student speech in cases involving new media.
Finally, Part III illustrates application of this Article‘s approach by
reviewing a few fact patterns of recent cases.
I. CASE BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has addressed restrictions on student speech in four
cases. The Court‘s initial foray into the area, Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,10 demonstrated a strong
commitment to the First Amendment rights of students. Since that time,
the Court has shown increasing deference to the choices made by school
administrators.11
In Tinker, plaintiffs sued for damages and an injunction after school
officials disciplined them for wearing black armbands to school to protest
the Vietnam War.12 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district
court‘s dismissal of the complaint.13 The tone of the opinion was set by the
Court‘s oft-quoted language that students do not ―shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.‖14
However, the Court recognized that school discipline involved a balance of
interests by acknowledging the ―authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools.‖15 The Court found the
balance favored free speech in Tinker because the disciplined conduct in
that case was closely ―akin to ‗pure speech‘‖ and there was no evidence
Cyberharassment After Morse v. Frederick, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 565, 566 (2010) (quoting
Janis Wolak et al., Does Online Harassment Constitute Bullying? An Exploration of Online
Harassment by Known Peers and Online-Only Contacts, 41 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S51, S51–52
(2007)). Incidents involving cyber and traditional forms of bullying have garnered national
attention. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, Strategies Take Shape for Trials in Bully Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/us/16bully.html?
ref=bullies; Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html?_r=1
(reporting the suicide of Rutgers University freshman Tyler Clementi after his roommate
surreptitiously streamed footage of his intimate dorm room encounter online).
10. 393 U.S. 503, 506–09, 513–14 (1969).
11. See infra notes 25–74 and accompanying text.
12. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
13. Id. at 514.
14. Id. at 506.
15. Id. at 507.
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that the restricted behavior materially disrupted the work of the school or
any class or collided ―with the rights of other students to be secure and to
be let alone.‖16 The Court also found it significant that school authorities
did not prohibit the wearing of all controversial symbols, but rather,
singled out the expression of one particular opinion.17
Although the district court concluded that school officials had a
reasonable fear of a disturbance, the Court emphasized that an
―undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance‖ or ―a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint‖ could not justify restrictions of otherwise protected
student speech.18 The Court held that student speech is protected unless it
―‗materially and substantially interfer[es] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‘‖ or ―collid[es] with
the rights of others.‖19
Justice Hugo Black wrote an influential dissenting opinion.20 He found
that there was ample evidence that the challenged armbands took students‘
minds off their class work and diverted them to thoughts about the
Vietnam War.21 However, Justice Black‘s more fundamental objection to
the majority‘s opinion, a position foreshadowing the views of more recent
courts,22 was that the Court improperly arrogated to itself, rather than to
elected state and school officials, the decision as to which school
disciplinary regulations were reasonable.23 In Justice Black‘s view,
students are sent to school to learn, and school discipline ―is an integral
16. Id. at 508, 513–14.
17. Id. at 510–11.
18. Id. at 508–09.
19. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). Subsequent
courts have not developed the second prong of Tinker‘s standard—allowing regulation of speech
that collides with the rights of others. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp.
2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (indicating that no court, to its knowledge, relied solely on the
invasion of rights of others to uphold a student speech regulation); Mollen, supra note 5, at 1517–
18; Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1094
(2008); Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students‟ Potentially Hurtful Speech
(Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 477 (2008). But see Harper v. Poway Unified Sch.
Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1177–78, 1182–83 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that T-shirts derogating
homosexuals violated the rights of other students and were therefore subject to regulation by school
administrators), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). For a critique of Harper, see Bonnie A. Kellman,
Note, Tinkering with Tinker: Protecting the First Amendment in Public Schools, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 367, 368–384 (2009). Broad application of the ―colliding with the rights of others‖ prong
could eliminate free speech rights at school because arguably the right of others to be let alone
includes not being captive to unwanted speech. See, e.g., Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356,
362–63 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715–18 (2000)).
20. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 518.
22. See infra notes 25–74 and accompanying text.
23. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting). To highlight what he perceived as the
foolishness of the Court‘s review for reasonableness, Justice Black referenced the Court‘s
controversial and disavowed due process reasonableness review during the Lochner era. Id. at 519–
20.
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and important part of training . . . children to be good citizens.‖24
The Court‘s first step back from the broad protection accorded student
speech in Tinker occurred in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.25 In
Fraser, a student gave a lewd, sexually explicit nominating speech before
an assembly of fourteen year olds.26 Both the district court and the court of
appeals found that the school‘s discipline of the student violated his First
Amendment rights as explicated in Tinker.27 The Supreme Court
reversed.28
The Fraser Court‘s decision was not inconsistent with Tinker. There
was evidence of disruption from the sexually explicit speech,29 and unlike
in Tinker, the discipline was not based upon the political viewpoint
articulated but upon the manner in which the speaker‘s ideas were
expressed.30
Nonetheless, the tenor of the opinion reflected a different view about
the relative balance between students‘ free speech rights and school
administrators‘ need to maintain discipline in the schools. Although it
acknowledged ―that students do not ‗shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,‘‖31 the Court
emphasized that the constitutional rights of minors in public schools are
different from the rights of adults in other settings.32 Specifically, the Court
identified the inculcation of fundamental values, including the teaching of
socially appropriate behavior, as a proper function of public schools.33
Perhaps more telling, the Court cited Justice Black‘s dissent in Tinker,
disavowing a purpose ―‗to hold that the Federal Constitution
compels . . . teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender
24. Id. at 524. Justice Black concluded that the case was ―wholly without constitutional
reasons . . . [and] subjects all the public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students.‖ Id. at 525. Justice John Marshall Harlan,
dissenting separately, expressed the view that school officials‘ disciplinary decisions should receive
the greatest deference and be upheld unless the complaining party met the burden of demonstrating
illegitimate purposes such as a desire to favor specific viewpoints. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
25. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
26. Id. at 677–78. ―The assembly was part of a school-sponsored educational program in selfgovernment.‖ Id. at 677. Students were required to attend the assembly or to report to the study hall.
Id.
27. Id. at 679–80.
28. Id. at 680.
29. At the assembly, some students ―hooted and yelled‖ while others made gestures
graphically simulating the sexual activity alluded to in the student‘s nominating speech. Id. at 678.
One teacher also reported that she found it necessary to forego a portion of her class lesson to
discuss the speech with the class. Id. Justice William Brennan, concurring in the judgment,
specifically found that it was not unconstitutional for the school officials to conclude that Fraser‘s
language was disruptive. Id. at 687–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 680, 685 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
32. Id. at 682.
33. Id. at 681, 683.
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control of the American public school system to public school students.‘‖34
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a high school exercised
editorial control over a school newspaper that was produced at the school‘s
expense as part of a journalism class.35 The Court distinguished Tinker as
involving the question of whether a school needed to tolerate particular
student speech.36 In contrast, the Kuhlmeier Court defined the question as
whether the First Amendment required a school to promote affirmatively
particular speech, here, articles chronicling students‘ experience with teen
pregnancy and divorce.37 Viewing school-sponsored speech as part of the
school curriculum,38 the Court held that educators could control the content
of student speech in ―school-sponsored expressive activities[39] so long as
the educators‘ actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.‖40 The Court concluded that the principal‘s decision to delete
two pages of the school newspaper was reasonably related to such
concerns.41
As in Fraser, the tone and language of the Kuhlmeier decision were
equally, if not more, significant than the result. Citing Fraser, the Court
reiterated that a ―school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its ‗basic educational mission.‘‖42 The Court included as
part of the school‘s mission ―‗awakening the child to cultural values‘‖ in
addition to preparing the student for later professional training and helping
him to adjust normally to his environment.43 The Court also quoted Justice
Black‘s Tinker dissent once again, disclaiming a purpose to transfer school
control from teachers, administrators, and elected officials to students.44
The Court‘s most recent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick,45
continued the trend toward increasing deference to the decisions of school
administrators.46 In Morse, a principal disciplined a student for waving a
banner bearing the phrase, ―BONG HiTS 4 JESUS‖ at an off-campus,

34. Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)).
35. 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988).
36. Id. at 270–71.
37. Id. at 263, 270–71.
38. Id. at 271.
39. The Court included within the scope of its decision all school-sponsored publications and
theatrical productions, not just those that were part of a specific class such as the journalism class in
Kuhlmeier. Id. at 271–73. Ostensibly, the Court would consider bulletin board presentations as well
as band and choir selections as school-sponsored.
40. Id. at 273.
41. Id. at 274–76.
42. Id. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
43. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953)). To the extent the
school‘s mission includes awakening the child to cultural values, some critical remarks by students
might be censored as inconsistent with the cultural values of tolerance or understanding.
44. Id. at 271 n.4.
45. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
46. See Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick Be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 17, 21 (2008).
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school-sponsored event.47 The Court began its analysis by rejecting
Frederick‘s argument that this was not a school speech case at all.48
Although it acknowledged some uncertainty about the applicability of
school speech cases with both on-campus and off-campus components,49
the Court stated that ―Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his fellow
students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he
is not at school.‖50 The Court next found that although the message of
Frederick‘s banner was cryptic, the principal‘s interpretation that the
banner promoted illegal drug use was a reasonable one.51 Having come to
that conclusion, the Court then framed the issue as ―whether a principal
may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a
school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal
drug use.‖52 In answering that question in the affirmative, Chief Justice
John Roberts reviewed the Court‘s earlier student speech cases.53
Chief Justice Roberts interpreted Tinker as holding that the ―‗mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint‘‖ was an insufficient justification for banning
political speech unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.54 He said
Fraser recognized the ―‗special characteristics of the school
environment‘‖55 and established two principles: (1) the constitutional
rights of students in public schools are not co-extensive with those of nonstudents in other settings and (2) Tinker‘s mode of analysis was not the
sole analytical approach in school speech cases.56 The Chief Justice
construed Kuhlmeier as directed to student speech that the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the school‘s imprimatur and therefore not
directly relevant to the case at hand. However, he took the case as
confirmation of the two principles he identified from Fraser.57
Chief Justice Roberts next cited Fourth Amendment precedent, social
science studies, and Congressional legislation to establish that deterring
drug use by school children is an important, if not compelling, interest.58
With that conclusion and the two principles he derived from Fraser and
Kuhlmeier,59 Chief Justice Roberts easily concluded that the principal‘s onthe-spot decision to prohibit Frederick‘s banner, which she reasonably
47.
48.
49.
2004)).
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
(1969)).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Morse, 551 U.S. at 397–98.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 401 (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir.
Id. at 401 (internal quotation marks and external citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 403–06.
Id. at 403–04 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
Id. at 405 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 406–08.
Id. at 404–05.
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interpreted as promoting drug use, did not violate the First Amendment.60
Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority opinion but wrote a
separate concurrence.61 In his view, Tinker should be overruled because the
First Amendment, as originally understood, provided no protection
whatsoever to student speech in public schools.62
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice
Anthony Kennedy joined.63 Although they both joined Chief Justice
Roberts‘s opinion, they wanted to highlight that the decision was limited to
allowing restrictions of speech reasonably interpreted as advocating illegal
drug use and ―provides no support for any restriction of speech that [could]
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue[.]‖64
Specifically, Justice Alito noted that the Court‘s opinion did not endorse
the view advocated by the United States and petitioners that school
officials be allowed to censor any student speech that ―interferes with a
school‘s ‗educational mission.‘‖65 Justice Alito identified the threat to the
physical safety of students posed by drug use as the special circumstance
that justified speech restrictions in Morse.66
Justice Stephen Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found
the First Amendment issues ―difficult‖ and ―portentous.‖67 Accordingly, he
preferred to simply hold that the student‘s claim was barred by the
principal‘s qualified immunity.68
Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices David Souter and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, dissented.69 The dissent acknowledged that (1) students‘
constitutional rights at school are not co-extensive with those of adults in
other settings and (2) deterring drug use by school children is a ―valid and
terribly important interest.‖70 However, the dissent believed that viewpoint
discrimination begins with a presumption of invalidity71 and therefore still
would not allow censorship of student speech unless either the prohibited
message itself violates a permissible rule or expressly advocates conduct
that is illegal and harmful to students.72 Justice Stevens found Frederick‘s
60. Id. at 409–10.
61. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 410–11, 422.
63. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 423 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 21, Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
(No. 06-278)). Such a test, he feared, would risk that some public schools would define their
educational mission to include inculcation of whatever political and social issues were held by the
majority. Id. at 423.
66. Id. at 425.
67. Id. at 425, 427–28 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 425.
69. Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 434.
71. Id. at 437–38.
72. Id. at 435. Justice Stevens acknowledged that ―while conventional speech may be
restricted only when likely to ‗incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action,‘ it is possible that [the Court‘s]
rigid imminence requirement ought to be relaxed at schools.‖ Id. at 439 (quoting Brandenburg v.
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obscure message to fall far short of express advocacy73 and accused the
majority of abdicating their constitutional responsibilities by giving such
great deference to the principal‘s judgment about the meaning of
Frederick‘s message.74
B. Lower Courts‟ Interpretations of the Supreme Court Cases
One might describe Fraser and Morse as mere offshoots of Tinker‘s
―substantial disruption‖ standard by viewing lewd speech and advocacy of
illegal activity as disruptive to a school‘s mission to teach fundamental
values. Under that approach, Kuhlmeier would be viewed as involving
government, not student, speech. By providing a single standard, such an
interpretation would remedy Justice Thomas‘s criticism in Morse that the
Court‘s jurisprudence says ―that students have a right to speak in schools
except when they don‘t.‖75
While many would question whether it should be the role of schools to
inculcate values,76 the Supreme Court has suggested that schools should be
able to teach ―fundamental‖ values.77 School officials and Justices may
disagree about what values are fundamental. However, the hypothesized
interpretation of the Supreme Court precedent would not give school
officials the power to define broadly their ―educational mission‖ to include
controversial political or social views as feared by Justice Alito in Morse.78
Whatever the merits of the hypothesized unified view of the Supreme
Court case law, it is not the interpretation adopted by lower courts, and it is
inconsistent with language in the majority opinion in Morse. Lower courts
generally have concluded that Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard
remains the basic rule when analyzing student speech issues unless the
speech is lewd, advocates drug use, or bears the school‘s imprimatur. That
is, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse are seen as mere exceptions to Tinker‟s
general rule.79 Lower courts‘ categorical approach to student speech cases
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
73. Id. at 439.
74. Id. at 441.
75. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring).
76. The real question is to what extent should schools be able to inculcate values. See
Heidlage, supra note 5, at 589–90 & nn.111–12 (2009); Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What
Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the DemocraticEducational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 63–64 (2002). Some value inculcation is inevitable,
if only through the choice of the curriculum. Id. at 84.
77. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 889 (1982) (Burger, J.,
dissenting).
78. 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring).
79. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 296 (3d Cir.
2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir.
Apr. 9, 2010); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch.
Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212–13
(3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996);
Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Denning & Taylor,
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is supported by Chief Justice Roberts‘ emphasis in Morse that Fraser and
Kuhlmeier established that Tinker was not the sole mode of analysis in
student speech cases.80
Where lower courts have erred, however, is in application of the Tinker
standard. More recent lower courts, possibly reacting to the development
of new media such as the Internet, cell phones, and social networking
sites,81 generally have applied the ―substantial disruption‖ standard to offcampus speech and find such speech unprotected when it reasonably may
cause substantial disruption at the school.82 Moreover, lower court
decisions, like the Supreme Court cases, do not identify how a court should
determine whether there is a ―substantial disruption‖ beyond almost
meaningless general statements. To find a ―substantial disruption,‖ courts,
following Tinker, require more than an undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance or avoidance of discomfort or
unpleasantness.83 On the other hand, lower courts state that school officials
do not have to wait until an actual disruption occurs before disciplining
student speech.84 With such limited guidance, ad hoc determinations as to
whether there is a reasonable threat of ―substantial disruption‖ necessarily
are the rule.85
As the following sections suggest, these decisions misunderstand and
poorly apply the Court‘s jurisprudence. Student speech that does not occur
under school supervision should receive the same First Amendment
protection as non-student speech. Conversely, student speech that occurs
under school supervision should be subject to a multi-factor balancing test
with great deference given to administrators, especially when the school‘s
discipline is not based upon the viewpoint of the speaker.
supra note 5, at 859–60.
80. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05 (majority opinion).
81. See Heidlage, supra note 5, at 574, 580.
82. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298 & n.6; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 48;
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38–39 (2d Cir. 2007); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d
1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding no disruption); Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F.
Supp. 2d 1114, 1124 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (also ―true threat‖ case); Killion v. Franklin Reg‘l Sch. Dist.,
136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455–56 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (finding no disruption). Many commentators also
favor applying Tinker to off-campus speech. See Heidlage, supra note 5, at 585 & nn. 87–88 (citing
sources); Emily K. Kerkhof, Note, MySpace, Yourspace, Ourspace: Student Cyberspeech, Bullying
and Their Impact on School Discipline, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1623, 1649–50 (2009). Older courts
were more willing to make geographical distinctions, limiting Tinker‘s application to on-campus
speech. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1979); Klein v.
Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986).
83. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298; Evans, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; Mardis,
684 F. Supp. 2d at 1123; Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D.
Mo. 1998); Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
84. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 298; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51; Nuxoll v. Indian
Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008); Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
85. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1065 (―The lower courts are all over the map in the way
in which they apply Tinker‘s requirement that the expression cause a material-and-substantial
disruption or interfere with the rights of others.‖); accord Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1648–49.
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II. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SCHOOL SPEECH ISSUES
Before explaining and justifying the recommended approach to student
speech, it is useful to discuss the unique characteristics of the public
primary and secondary school environment that necessitate special First
Amendment treatment of student speech issues.
A. Special Characteristics of the School Environment
The school environment requires distinctive First Amendment rules if
schools are to function properly. Schools must decide on a curriculum;
teachers are not free to discuss whatever subject strikes their fancies.
Teachers need to be able to discipline students for talking out of turn or
otherwise disrupting class with speech unrelated to the day‘s lesson.
Grades necessarily are based on the content and quality of the students‘
writings. Topics often must be assigned—students are not always free to
choose their own message.
Mandatory attendance laws also define the school environment. Such
laws result in a student‘s forced exposure to the speech of other students.
Avoidance of the person or turning off the medium of communication is
not an option.86 Moreover, required attendance prevents parents from
providing protection and guidance to their children during school hours
and limits parents‘ ability to monitor and exercise control over the persons
with whom their children associate.87 As a consequence, schools have a
custodial responsibility to protect students‘ safety and can consider the
rights of other students when defining limits on student speech.88 In some
areas, such as sexual harassment, the law requires school officials to
protect the rights of others.89

86. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.).
87. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); Jacob Tabor,
Note, Students‟ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet: Off-Campus Cyberspeech and
School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 573 n.105 (2009).
88. Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (discussing students‘
rights under the Fourth Amendment).
89. Title IX provides that ―[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .‖ 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(2006). Schools can be liable for sexual harassment of a student on school grounds if the school
(1) ha[s] had adequate notice that it could be held liable for the conduct at issue;
(2) ha[s] acted with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment;
(3) exercise[s] substantial control over the harasser and the context where the
known harassment occurs; and (4) . . . the harassment is so ―severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive‖ that it effectively bars the victim‘s access to an educational
opportunity or benefit.
Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1095 (quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999)); Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–50.
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B. Rules for Student Speech Outside School Supervision
1. Rule and Justifications
Of course, noting that the school environment requires special rules
does not define what those rules should be. However, as discussed below,
the unique characteristics of the school environment generally are not
present when student speech occurs outside school supervision.
Accordingly, this Article recommends that student speech outside school
supervision receive full First Amendment protection90 and specifically
rejects Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ test, the dominant test applied by
lower courts to off-campus student speech.91
When student speech occurs outside school supervision, the speech is
not graded, will not directly disturb the classroom92 or impact the
curriculum, and does not require snap decisions by school administrators.93
Other students are not required to listen to student speech outside school
supervision. Speech outside school supervision cannot threaten schools
with Title IX liability. Schools, by definition, have no custodial
responsibility for students outside their supervision. While student speech
occurring outside school supervision may threaten students under school
supervision, such risks may be protected against under the ―true threat‖
doctrine.94
Providing full protection of off-campus speech has the advantage of
clarity. Clear rules generally are desirable because they provide
predictability and reduce the need for litigation. However, the value of
clarity in this area is particularly acute. Unclear rules risk chilling speech.
It is for that reason that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines have
special application in the First Amendment context.95
Equally important, unless rules are clear, school officials will have little
incentive to protect students‘ First Amendment rights. School officials
have a qualified immunity. They cannot be subject to a damages award
unless their conduct violates ―‗clearly established‘ statutory or

90. This Article does suggest a slight difference in the student speech context in the
definitions of ―true threats,‖ see infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text, and possibly ―fighting
words,‖ see infra note 149 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. Off-campus speech, by definition, does not take place in a classroom or at a school
activity. As such, it cannot directly interfere with a teacher‘s lesson or the school-supervised
activity. Although off-campus speech may later create incidental disruption on campus, see, e.g.,
infra notes 100–01, 199–207 and accompanying text, such disruption is ―different in kind to a
student standing up during a lecture and telling the teacher that . . . the teacher is a terrible teacher.‖
Tabor, supra note 87, at 592. There also are alternative measures to deal with speech that only
indirectly causes a disruption. Id. at 593; see also infra notes 153–58 and accompanying text.
93. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
94. See infra Part II.B.3.
95. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010).
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.‖96
To be clearly established, ―the right allegedly violated must be defined at
the appropriate level of specificity[.]‖97 Although students still could get
injunctive relief, few families will choose to absorb the costs of litigation
to reverse a suspension that often has already been served.98 Thus, without
clear rules, school officials will have little fear that their disciplinary
decisions will be reversed.
Treating speech outside of school supervision as deserving of full First
Amendment protection has the advantage of making restrictions on speech
under school supervision more like a time, place, and manner regulation.
By leaving other channels for student speech open, greater restrictions on
student speech can be justified where they are truly needed.99
This is not to say that off-campus student speech does not have the
ability to result in substantial disruption on campus. For example, posting
on the Internet that another student is gay can cause harassment at school,
which interferes with the learning process.100 Similarly, comments on
social networking sites criticizing teachers can interfere with the studentteacher relationship at school.101 Undoubtedly, such concerns have led
lower courts to apply Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ test to student
speech wherever it occurs.102
The problem with the ―substantial disruption‖ test as applied to offcampus speech, however, is that it covers too much. A letter to the editor
of the New York Times criticizing a school‘s choice of curriculum can
create a substantial disturbance on campus. Such a letter may result in a
flood of calls to administrators or even make adoption of the school‘s
curriculum choice impossible. Similarly, the ―substantial disruption‖ test
could allow the government to punish students for watching popular
television shows or reading particular magazines, newspaper articles, or
books for fear that discussion at school of such normally protected speech
will disrupt classes or interfere with the fundamental values that the school
seeks to teach.103 It is not even clear that truthful speech accusing a teacher
96. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (finding that it is not enough that the
government actor‘s conduct is ultimately found unlawful).
97. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).
98. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
99. Id.; accord Killion v. Franklin Reg‘l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 457 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
100. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir. 2008). Judge
Richard Posner opined that if a student‘s negative comments about homosexuality ―will lead to a
decline in students‘ test scores, upsurge in truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school,‖ it may be
prohibited under Tinker. Id.
101. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 293 (3d Cir. 2010),
reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d. Cir. Apr.
9, 2010).
102. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1056 (―[M]ost courts . . . have suggested that they might
be willing to apply Tinker in any student expression case, even if the student speech is plainly off
campus, as long as the speech causes a substantial disruption at the school.‖).
103. See id. at 1093.
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of sexual harassment or school officials of providing answers to
standardized tests would be protected under the ―substantial disruption‖
test.104
Application of Tinker to off-campus speech also risks extension of
Fraser and Morse to student speech outside school supervision. Although
that risk has not yet come to fruition in reported cases,105 the prospect of
schools policing sexual innuendo in student homes is more than a little
troubling and may inhibit a variety of student expression. Conversely, the
fear that on-campus precedents would be applied to off-campus speech
may cause courts to give less deference than is desirable to school officials
in cases of on-campus speech restrictions.106 This may handcuff courts
from properly dealing with the worst cases of abuse—the types that cause
students to stay home from or change schools.107
Moreover, adoption of the Tinker test for speech outside school
supervision is not necessary to protect against the most troubling problems
created by student speech. Speech that a reasonable person would interpret
as a threat to student or teacher safety may be disciplined under the ―true
threat‖ doctrine.108 Fighting words or obscenity also may be challenged
under the First Amendment principles applicable to non-students.109 Offcampus comments that result in on-campus harassment or disruption may
not be punished, but the persons engaging in the harassment or disruption
on campus may be disciplined. Where a student while off campus
advocates punishable behavior that causes a material disruption on
campus, he may be disciplined as a co-conspirator. Of course, students
injured by off-campus speech still have recourse to the offending student‘s
parents, the police, and tort law.110

104. While no court to date has abused the ―substantial disruption‖ test to the extent
hypothesized in the text, reliance on judicial discretion to sensibly apply such an amorphous test
would risk chilling protected expression and devalue all First Amendment speech rights.
105. See id. at 1069–70. Given the cost of litigation and the generally short duration of most
sanctions, many cases of school discipline are not challenged, much less reported. See Thomas v.
Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir. 1979); Schauer, supra note 4, at 225–26. Accordingly,
schools may already be applying Fraser and Morse to student speech outside school supervision.
106. Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1044–45 (―[O]ur willingness to defer to the schoolmaster‘s expertise
in administering school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that the arm of
authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.‖).
107. See Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1650 n.233 (citing Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H.
Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully: Should Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes Be the Answer?,
12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 53, 55 (2005)).
108. See infra Part II.B.3.
109. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (―fighting words‖);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (obscenity).
110. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 883–84 & n.263; Papandrea, supra note 19, at
1100–01.
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2. Supreme Court Support for Full First Amendment for Student
Speech Outside School Supervision
Although the Supreme Court has never heard a case in which a student
was disciplined for speech outside school supervision, the dichotomy this
Article suggests finds strong support in Supreme Court opinions.
The Court has repeatedly indicated that off-campus speech receives
greater protection than on-campus speech. In Morse, the Court declared,
―Had Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside the school
context, it would have been protected.‖111 Similarly, in Kuhlmeier, the
Court stated, ―A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent
with its ‗basic educational mission,‘ even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.‖112
However, the strongest endorsement of full First Amendment
protection for student speech outside school supervision derives from the
analytical approach of the majority in Morse. Before addressing the First
Amendment rules applicable to student speech, the Court rejected the
defendant‘s argument that the case was not a school speech case at all.113
To conclude the case was indeed a school speech case, the Court relied
upon the facts that (1) the event occurred during school hours and was an
approved event or class trip and (2) teachers and administrators were
interspersed among students whom they were charged with supervising.114
The clear implication was that if the student speech did not occur under
school supervision, Morse would not be a student speech case, and normal
First Amendment protections would apply.
The apparent basis for lower courts‘ applications of Tinker‘s
―substantial disruption‖ standard to off-campus speech appears to be the
language in Tinker:
―[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.‖115
111. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); see also id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(―I take the Court‘s point that the message on Frederick‘s banner is not necessarily protected
speech, even though it unquestionably would have been had the banner been unfurled elsewhere.‖);
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (―If
respondent had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been
penalized . . . .‖).
112. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
113. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01 (majority opinion).
114. Id.
115. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 313 n.15 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Chagares, J., concurring in part) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969)), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
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However, immediately prior to the quoted language, the Tinker Court said,
A student‘s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours,
he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects[,] . . . if he does so without ―materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school‖ and
without colliding with the rights of others.116
Thus, when placed in context, the highlighted language was not meant to
indicate that speech outside school supervision was subject to Tinker‘s
standard, but rather to ensure that speech on campus, but outside the
classroom, was subject to regulation under Tinker.117
3. True Threats
Given the modern rash of violent crimes in school settings,118 one might
fear that schools would not be able to protect adequately students if they
could not consider Columbine-type threats made outside of school
supervision when disciplining students. However, this fear is unjustified.
Subjecting student speech outside school supervision to non-student First
Amendment principles does not immunize student speech. In particular,
the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Constitution permits
government to proscribe ―true threats.‖119
A statement constitutes a ―true threat‖ if it would communicate to a
reasonable person a serious intent to cause a present or future harm.120
―The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a
prohibition on true threats ‗protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence‘
and ‗from the disruption that fear engenders,‘ in addition to protecting
people ‗from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.‘‖121
Nonetheless, speech is not a true threat merely because it is ―vituperative,
abusive, and inexact.‖122 For example, in Watts v. United States, the
7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
116. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
117. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 593 F.3d at 313 n.15. The case cited by Tinker after the ―in class or
out of it‖ language, Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749, 753 (5th Cir.
1966), also involved on-campus speech.
118. See Time Line of Worldwide School Shootings, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/
ipa/A0777958.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
119. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969) (per curiam).
120. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Mardis v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114,
1118 (E.D. Mo. 2010); O‘Neal v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. SA-08-CA-1031-XR, 2010 WL
376602, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2010).
121. Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
122. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
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defendant was prosecuted under a statute making it illegal to threaten the
life of the President of the United States.123 The Supreme Court reversed
the defendant‘s conviction and found that the defendant‘s statements that
he would refuse induction into the armed forces and if they ever made him
carry a rifle, the first man he would want to get in his sights was L.B.J.,
were mere hyperbole and not a true threat against the life of the
President.124
While courts, such as the Court in Watts, may be reluctant to find a
―true threat‖ outside the school context, they appear much more willing to
give great deference to primary and secondary school administrators
imposing discipline when the school officials find a true threat.125 There
are sound reasons for the difference. First, the true threat cases outside the
school context generally have involved criminal prosecutions.126 In
criminal cases, the consequences of finding the defendant‘s speech
unprotected are significantly greater than in school discipline cases, and
the prosecutor needs to establish her case ―beyond a reasonable doubt.‖
Second, courts are aware of the epidemic of school violence and are
sensitive to the risks schools would face if they failed to act when
confronted with student threats.127 Finally, ―the heightened vulnerability
of students arising from the lack of parental protection and the close
proximity of students with one another makes schools places of ‗special
danger‘ to the physical safety of the student.‖ 128 As a result, the majority,
if not all, of the judges in Morse opined that they would be more willing
to defer to school administrators where student safety was involved than
they would to decisionmakers outside the school context.129 Thus, under
the proposed approach to off-campus student speech, school officials,
through the ―true threat‖ doctrine, would still be able to rely on speech
outside their supervision to suspend students who the officials reasonably
perceive as posing a physical threat to other students.130
123. Id. at 705.
124. Id. at 706, 708 (referring to then-President Lyndon Baines Johnson).
125. See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2007);
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007); Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch.
Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 626–27 (8th Cir. 2002); see also O‟Neal, 2010 WL 376602, at *13–14 (finding
that college officials are subject to the ―true threat‖ standard of Watts rather than the lesser standard
applicable to primary and secondary school officials).
126. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. 2002). Of course, the major
Supreme Court ―true threat‖ cases involved criminal prosecutions. See Black, 538 U.S. at 348–49;
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379–81; Watts, 394 U.S. at 706–08.
127. See, e.g., Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771–72; Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978,
983–84 (11th Cir. 2007).
128. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
129. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 409–10 (majority opinion); id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring);
id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Discipline needs to be timely. Absent further incidents, allowing a student to attend
classes for extended periods following the challenged speech should negate a school official‘s claim
that she perceived a true threat. Cf. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir.
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4. The Special Case of Cyberbullying
Commentators who recommend that school officials should have broad
power to discipline speech outside school supervision generally are
motivated by a desire to combat cyberbullying.131 Undoubtedly,
cyberbullying has become a significant problem and presents unique First
Amendment issues. It is not easy to balance the respective interests of the
alleged bully, her victim, the school, and society. However, in no event
should the appropriate remedy be a school official unilaterally assuming
the power to discipline speech occurring outside her supervision.
There is little question that cyberbullying is on the increase and can
cause substantial damage to troubled teens.132 A 2010 study by the
Cyberbullying Research Center found that one in five middle school
students were affected by ―willful and repeated harm‖ inflicted through
phones and computers.133 According to the Federal Probation Juvenile
Department, ―‗[ninety] percent of middle-school students have had their
feelings hurt online‘ . . . .‖134 Victims of bullying experience a variety of
psychological harms that, in extreme cases, may lead to suicide.135
Although it is natural to want to avoid the damage cyberbullying can
cause, there are reasons to be reluctant to regulate such student
communications outside school supervision. Verbal bullying occurred long
before computers and text messaging were invented. Moreover, given the
closed environment in which children grew up, derogatory statements
about a student quickly circulated throughout the neighborhood. Yet, such
name-calling outside of school has never been subject to school regulation.
Rather, it is standard First Amendment doctrine that speech that does not
invade the privacy of others should not be restricted just because some may
find the speech offensive.136 While there might be little harm in eliminating
2004) (noting that the student attended school without incident for two years before threatening
drawing surfaced).
131. See, e.g., Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1650–51; Renee L. Servance, Comment,
Cyberbullying, Cyber-harassment, and the Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1238–39; Tabor, supra note 87, at 562–63.
132. See, e.g., Cyberbullying, STOP BULLYING NOW!, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.gov/adults/cy
ber-bullying.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2011); Posting of Tara Parker-Pope to N.Y. Times Well
Blog, More Teens Victimized by Cyber-Bullies, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/moreteens-victimized-by-cyber-bullies/ (Nov. 27, 2007, 13:51 EST).
133. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html.
134. Moy, supra note 9, at 566 (quoting Alvin W. Cohn, Juvenile Focus, 71 FED. PROBATION
44, 50 (2007)).
135. Servance, supra note 131, at 1216–17; Christopher Maag, When the Bullies Turned
Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, at ST9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/16/fash
ion/16meangirls.html.
136. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (―After all, much political and religious
speech might be perceived as offensive to some.‖); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21–
22 (1971). Of course, if speech is so offensive as to provoke imminent unlawful action, it may be
regulated under the ―fighting words‖ doctrine. See id. at 20; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
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a student‘s ability to call a fellow student ―a stupid, fat whore,‖ not all
cases of what may be considered cyberbullying have such little social
value. Regulation of cyberbullying also may silence religious or political
views. For example, a student might be disciplined for expressing the
opinion that homosexuality is immoral on another student‘s Facebook
page. A truthful statement posted on the Internet claiming that a candidate
running for class president cheated on an exam and then lied about it could
result in discipline. In one case, an honor student was disciplined for
posting on Facebook, ―‗To those select students who have had the
displeasure of having Ms. Sarah Phelps [a teacher], or simply knowing her
and her insane antics: Here is the place to express your feelings of
hatred‘ . . . .‖137 Whether or not one views this as a political comment
about government workers, silencing such speech undermines the First
Amendment value in self-expression said to be necessary to the
autonomous self138 and undercuts school teachings about the value of First
Amendment freedoms.139 Additionally, silencing such speech may lead
students to act out their complaints in more violent ways. Finally,
regulating cyberbullying increases the likelihood that schools will be able
to monitor students‘ phone messages, mall conversations, and discussions
with friends. That prospect will inevitably result in chilling student speech
and raises the ugly head of a totalitarian state.
On the other hand, a strong case can be made for some regulation of
cyberbullying. First, as suggested above, cyberbullying can cause
significant harm. Cyberbullying, as any form of bullying, can result in a
wide range of psychological harm. Victims of bullying may suffer low selfesteem, anxiety, depression, or social withdrawal.140 Increased difficulty
concentrating, stress, or truancy may compromise the student‘s
education.141 Medical journals also report that kids who are tormented
online are more likely to get detention or be suspended.142 Some victims of
bullying may eventually strike back with violence toward the bully or
innocent bystanders.143 In any event, ―studies show serious long-term
effects into adulthood such as depression, negative self-concept, and
suicide.‖144 Second, the maturity levels of students make them particularly
137. Carmen Gentile, Student Fights Record of „Cyberbullying,‟ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, at
A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/us/08cyberbully.html.
138. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978);
Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 23.
139. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Teaching that Speech Matters: A Framework for Analyzing
Speech Issues in Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 825, 826 (2009).
140. Servance, supra note 131, at 1216.
141. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2008);
Parker-Pope, supra note 132.
142. Parker-Pope, supra note 132.
143. Severance, supra note 131, at 1216–17.
144. Id. (citing Sandra Graham & Jaana Juvonen, Self-Blame and Peer Victimization in Middle
School: An Attributional Analysis, 34 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 587, 587 (1998); Ken Rigby,
Health Consequences of Bullying and Its Prevention in Schools, in PEER HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL:
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susceptible to the harms from bullying.145 The Supreme Court has
recognized that minors‘ immaturity should be taken into account when
shaping First Amendment protection in the context of indecent speech.146
The government‘s interest in protecting minors from psychologically
damaging speech seems at least as strong as its interest in shielding
youngsters from sexual expression.147 Just as the Court has suggested that
the requirement for a true threat may be reduced in the school context,148
the vulnerability of students may justify lowering the threshold for finding
speech to constitute ―fighting words.‖149 Third, the ―marketplace of ideas‖
metaphor for First Amendment protection has limited force in the context
of cyberbullying. Although, as suggested above, regulating cyberbullying
may chill some beneficial speech, the reality is that most disciplined
speech will have little social value. Moreover, in the cyberbullying context,
the marketplace metaphor suffers from a market failure.150 There is no
adequate response to false ideas when psychological damage has already
been done to vulnerable minors. Finally, cyberbullying can be
distinguished from the verbal abuse experienced face-to-face. With the use
of technology, derogatory statements may be transmitted widely and
instantaneously from anywhere. More important, the statements are
written. While verbal abuse can cause the same harm as cyberbullying,
policing such abuse is impractical because the bully and victim often will
tell different stories. Where the harassment is written, there are not the
same proof problems.151
Nonetheless, even if cyberbullying is a major problem that needs to be
addressed, the remedy should not be a school official assuming the power
to discipline off-campus speech. Punishment, in the first instance, should
be left to parents. The Supreme Court has indicated that the parental right
is a fundamental one under the Fourteenth Amendment.152 It should not be
interfered with absent special circumstances.153 Parents know their children
THE PLIGHT OF THE VULNERABLE AND VICTIMIZED 310, 322–23 (Jaana Juvonen & Sandra Graham
eds., 2001)).
145. One commentator has suggested that the special vulnerability of students justifies
regulating off-campus cyberspeech harassing students but not speech directed toward teachers or
school officials. See Tabor, supra note 87, at 599–603.
146. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 638–39 (1968).
147. See Tabor, supra note 87, at 600.
148. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10; id. at 424–25 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at
439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
150. See Blocher, supra note 7, at 829–30, 834–35.
151. However, there still may be an issue as to who sent the problematic communication. See
Hoffman, supra note 133 (reporting how principal concluded that harassing text messages were not
sent by the owner of the phone).
152. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
153. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213–14 (1972).
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better than anyone and have the greatest ability and interest in teaching
appropriate behavior. In the case of conflicting lessons, parents should be
able to determine which interest should prevail when their child is under
their supervision. For example, assume that Bill has been using the Internet
to harass Jane, who has been too embarrassed by the messages to notify
anyone. After repeated disturbing messages, Jane finally responds with an
e-mail, ―You are a stupid jerk, and I and everyone else hates you.‖
Application of a school‘s no tolerance for cyberbullying policy would
result in Jane‘s discipline. Jane‘s parents, however, may be more
sympathetic to Jane‘s injury and want to provide a different message.
While not condoning her method of expression, Jane‘s parents may want to
provide positive feedback for the normally shy Jane‘s standing up for
herself. In cases where parents fail to act or there is more systematic or
severe harassment, recourse may be made to tort and criminal laws.154 The
higher burden of proof required by such laws reduces the risk of chilling
protected speech. Tort and criminal laws do impose litigation costs.
However, such costs may have beneficial effects. Students and their
parents will have little incentive to challenge questionable conduct that
does little more than cause minor hurt feelings. School officials, however,
would not be immune from such complaints. Trying to resolve all cases of
hurt feelings, whether generated on or off campus, would open up a
Pandora‘s box of problems for school administrators. Conversely, the
penalties available through the judicial system more effectively can deter
the more serious instances of cyberbullying. Leaving discipline to parents
and the judicial process also has the advantage of keeping schools
institutions of learning as opposed to penal institutions. If schools start
policing and punishing off-campus speech, students‘ views of schools,
teachers, and administrators may be altered in a manner that interferes with
the learning process itself.
This is not to suggest that the school should have no role in remedying
cyberbullying. On the contrary, there are several approaches that some
schools have adopted that should have wider application. For example,
some high schools have achieved great results through the ―Names‖
program, which the Anti-Defamation League sponsors and supervises.
―Guided by teachers, trained student volunteers and league facilitators,
students talk with the unflinching candor of children about topics most
adults would prefer to avoid: gossip, rumor, physical harassment, racism,
homophobia, depression, eating disorders, self-mutilation, drinking, drugs,
suicide—the full range of bullying behavior and its consequences.‖155
Although the ―Names‖ program requires two months of training by
154. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 5, at 883–84 & n.263; Papandrea, supra note 19, at
1100. But see Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdiction to
Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257, 275–80 (2008) (detailing
practical problems with pursuing criminal or civil remedies).
155. Gerri Hirshey, Pushing Back at Bullying, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/28rbully.html?pagewanted=1&_r
=1.
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students and staff, ―[a] follow-up survey of the ‗Names‘ program in San
Diego in 2000 found that 60 percent of students said that after the session
they would be less likely to call someone a name; nearly half reported
positive changes in other students‘ behavior.‖156 Of course, even without
the power to discipline, school officials can talk to the alleged offender and
explain the harm he is causing. In more serious cases of harassment,
administrators can refer complaints to the police.157 Administrators also
can monitor the offender‘s behavior at school.158 The worst cyberbullies
are likely to engage in bullying tactics there too. Those behaviors could and
should be subject to discipline. Guidance counselors can meet with and
assist the victims of bullying. Schools can educate parents about the
possible harms of digital media and encourage them to more closely
supervise their children‘s digital speech activities.159 Schools, through
Parent Teacher Associations, might organize ―parents‘ counsels‖ that are
charged with investigating allegations of cyberbullying. Where wrongdoing
is found, the counsel or a school administrator can publicize the name of
the wrongdoer, notify his parents, and correct any false claims that may
have been made. What school officials should not do, however, is
independently discipline student speech outside their supervision. Even if
one concluded that schools should and constitutionally could discipline
off-campus cyberbullying, authorization should come from state
legislatures, rather than having non-elected administrators unilaterally
assume that power. Thus, neither cyberbullying nor threats of violence
justify extending school authority to student speech outside their
supervision.
C. Rule for Student Speech Occurring Under School Supervision
1. General Approach
When student speech occurs under school supervision, the Supreme
Court‘s student speech cases control.160 Unless speech is lewd, advocates
drug use, or bears the school‘s imprimatur, lower courts generally have
concluded that Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard remains the basic
test for analyzing on-campus student speech issues.161 The difficulty is
determining what speech under school supervision satisfies the Tinker
standard.162 This section presents an approach to that problem.
156. Id. Cyberbullying education also has had international success. A study conducted in
Norway ―found that the incidence of bullying in Norwegian schools fell by [fifty] percent or more
in the two years after an anti-bullying campaign; truancy, theft and vandalism also dropped
markedly.‖ Id.
157. The police have greater investigative resources than school administrators, and the mere
police involvement should act as a deterrent to further cyberharassment.
158. See Hoffman, supra note 133.
159. See Papandrea, supra note 19, at 1100.
160. See supra notes 25–74 and accompanying text.
161. See sources cited supra note 79.
162. See Kerkhof, supra note 82, at 1648–49.
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There is little question that students‘ constitutional rights at school must
be restricted for schools to properly function.163 The Supreme Court also
has recognized the practical need to give school officials‘ disciplinary
decisions substantial deference if federal courts are not to usurp the
authority of school boards and administrators.164 Given this deference to
school administrators, the need to restrict student rights and the difficulty
in determining what constitutes a substantial disruption, it might seem
more efficient, as Justice Thomas suggests, to disavow any review of
school administrators‘ disciplinary decisions.165 After all, few cases are
likely to be reversed; yet the number of cases brought and the costs of
pursuing litigation are huge. Such an approach, what Professors Martin
Redish and Kevin Finnerty call the ―civic republican‖ model of value
inculcation,166 although tempting, is untenable. For example, a school
board could prohibit any statement in support of the Republican Party or
Republican candidates. In short, the government could indoctrinate youth
to its desired views and create a totalitarian state.167 As Judge Richard
Posner has stated,
The murderous fanaticism displayed by young German
soldiers in World War II, alumni of the Hitler Jugend,
illustrates the danger of allowing government to control the
access of children to information and opinion. Now that
eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, it is obvious that
they must be allowed the freedom to form their political views
on the basis of uncensored speech before they turn eighteen,
so that their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the
franchise. . . . People are unlikely to become well-functioning,
independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are
raised in an intellectual bubble.168
With the threat of totalitarianism in the absence of any First
Amendment rights and the operational needs of the schools to significantly
restrict First Amendment rights, the ―substantial disruption‖ test
necessarily requires a balance of the school‘s, the students‘, and the
public‘s respective interests. Unfortunately, courts have not adequately
identified how the proper balance should be achieved. To remedy that
problem, this Article enumerates a number of factors that administrators
163. See supra Part II.A.
164. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409–10 (2007); id. at 421 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267, 273 (1988); see also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525–26 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
165. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting First Amendment
protection for student speech based upon his understanding of the original meaning of the
Constitution).
166. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 76, at 85–86, 96.
167. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 877 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Tinker, 393
U.S. at 511; Redish & Finnerty, supra note 76, at 78–83.
168. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass‘n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2001).
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and judges should consider when determining whether on-campus student
speech should be deemed to create a substantial disruption under Tinker.
Administrators‘ evaluation of the recommended factors should be given
great deference, particularly when the school discipline is not viewpointbased. If, as suggested in this Article, students‘ off-campus speech carries
full First Amendment rights,169students in today‘s technological age
generally will have ample avenues of communication available to them off
campus to adequately express their ideas and feelings.
2. Factors to Consider When Determining Whether Tinker‘s
―Substantial Disruption‖ Standard Has Been Met
a. Curricular Matters
When evaluating a school‘s interest, the initial inquiry is whether the
speech is related to curricular matters. Schools necessarily make contentbased restrictions when deciding on curriculum and choosing and
evaluating assignments. They must be permitted to do so if schools are to
function properly. As Professor Mark Cordes has said, ―Schools exist for
educational, and not speech purposes, and therefore legitimate curricular
and educational concerns should necessarily trump student speech
interests.‖170
The Supreme Court has recognized that schools have a role in
inculcating fundamental values.171 Thus, restrictions on the manner of
student speech designed to teach civility also might be given great
deference. Although what constitutes a fundamental value is subject to
debate, restrictions silencing discussion on controversial issues, such as
abortion or the war in Iraq, would be the most problematic. Nonetheless,
courts should be reluctant to overly rely on a school‘s ability to teach
fundamental values when analyzing student speech cases. Often, so-called
―fundamental values‖ can conflict, particularly if one acknowledges that
the right to free speech is a fundamental one. If a student wears a T-shirt
that reads, ―Homosexuality is shameful,‖172 does discipline further the
fundamental values of civility and tolerance or violate the fundamental
values in diversity of opinions and free religious expression?173

169. See supra Part II.B.1.
170. Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 688 (2009); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
267, 271 (1988).
171. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979).
172. See Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated,
549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
173. One also can question whether schools should instill fundamental values or merely teach
them. That is, while it is clear the school can and should teach (and can test) that it is important to
be civil to others, it is less clear that they should be able to silence a contrary view or punish a
student for not adopting those teachings in his everyday life.
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b. Location of Speech
Related to whether speech affects curricular matters is the location
where the speech occurs. Speech that takes place in the classroom or
during an assembly more clearly threatens a disruption than speech uttered
in the halls or the cafeteria. This is not to suggest, however, that speech
that occurs in a classroom necessarily is disruptive. Obviously, a proper
student response to a teacher‘s query causes no disruption. Even
unauthorized speech in the classroom may not cause any harm. For
example, if a student posts something on his website during class while he
waits for his fellow students to finish an assignment that he has completed,
there has been no substantial disruption from the act of posting.
c. Type of Restriction—Discriminatory or Neutral?
A critical question when evaluating a student‘s and the public‘s interest
is where on the viewpoint-/content-neutrality spectrum the school‘s
regulation lies. Viewpoint discrimination is the most suspect under the
First Amendment.174 ―It is fundamental that the First Amendment ‗was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired by the people.‘‖175 Yet, government
regulation based on viewpoint is an anathema to positive change and
maximizes the risk of creating a totalitarian state. Quite simply, ideological
discipline is not a proper undertaking for school authorities.176Accordingly,
a school official‘s viewpoint-based discipline of student speech should
receive the least deference, and courts should be least willing to find that
the student speech was likely to cause a substantial disruption. Contentbased restrictions, although not as egregious as viewpoint-based
regulations, also normally are presumptively invalid.177 One reason is that,
in some circumstances, content-based restrictions, by preserving the status
quo, act as de facto viewpoint discrimination. For example, a rule
prohibiting discussion of the United States‘ involvement in the war in Iraq
174. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (―The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.‖ (citing Perry Educ. Ass‘n
v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983))); accord Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 436 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). When curricular assignments designate a particular
viewpoint, the presumption should be that the assignment is for legitimate pedagogical purposes
and not motivated by a desire to regulate the opinion or perspective of the student. Cf. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. at 273 (―[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.‖).
175. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
176. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
177. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584
(2010); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). Content-based restrictions concerning
curricular matters, however, are necessary for effective operation of schools and cannot be
considered presumptively invalid.
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silences dissent as effectively as a regulation regulating only speech
contrary to the war effort. Thus, a court should give limited deference to
school officials‘ content-based discipline of student speech, at least outside
curricular matters. Finally, content-neutral regulation on student speech
raises the fewest First Amendment concerns. Accordingly, an
administrator‘s content-neutral discipline of student speech should be
given the most deference and courts should be most willing to uphold a
finding that the student‘s speech would result in a substantial disruption.
d. Effect on Political Institutions
Also relevant to the public‘s interest is the extent to which school
regulations undermine political institutions. This corresponds to the
greatest fear of restriction on student speech—the creation of a totalitarian
state. Thus, a school‘s prohibition of speech endorsing a particular
candidate for office is much more problematic than restrictions on a
student‘s ability to make gratuitous derogatory comments about fellow
students. This is not to suggest that only political speech deserves First
Amendment protection. The First Amendment also protects the
individual‘s right to self-expression, which is an essential aspect of
personhood and autonomy.178 Rather, it is a frank recognition that to the
extent that one is balancing interests, distinctions can be made between the
values of certain types of speech.179 While valuing speech may be
inconsistent with First Amendment theory, the Court often has considered
whether a regulation affects ―core‖ First Amendment speech or low-value
speech that offers little contribution to the ―marketplace of ideas.‖180
e. Effect on Rights of Others
Language in Tinker suggests that interference with the rights of others
is an alternative prong to demonstration of a substantial disruption to
justify regulation of student speech.181 Courts, however, have rightly been
hesitant to rely on that justification for regulation.182 Applied literally,
Tinker‘s interference with the rights of others prong might eliminate all
student First Amendment speech rights. After all, other students arguably
have a right not to be captive to unwanted speech.183 Nonetheless, to the
178. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Baker,
supra note 138, at 994; Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 23.
179. Moreover, the interests in self-expression and personal autonomy are largely protected by
the ability to express oneself freely outside school supervision.
180. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (―Political speech . . . is ‗at the
core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.‘‖ (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion))); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986)
(noting the distinction between the political message in Tinker and the sexual message in Fraser‘s
speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 762 (1982) (noting that the First Amendment value of
child pornography is exceedingly modest).
181. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
182. See sources cited supra note 19.
183. See Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 363 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–18 (2000)).
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extent the determination of whether there is a substantial disruption
requires a balancing of interests, it is natural to consider the challenged
speech‘s effects on other students. For example, one might distinguish
between a T-shirt that says, ―Homosexuality is a sin‖ and one that says a
particular student is sinful because he is gay, based upon the differential
effects upon that student. The latter message is likely to bring greater
attention and embarrassment to and increased harassment of the targeted
student. Consideration of the rights of others even more clearly deserves
weight where a school‘s failure to act may subject it to a lawsuit for
negligent supervision or harassment.184
f. Age of Students
The age of the student disciplined and her audience also should be
considered. The younger the audience, the more impressionable and
vulnerable it may be and the greater the damage that can be done by some
poorly chosen words.185 The younger the speaker, the more important it is
to teach discipline and manners and the less likely that the speaker would
be making a significant contribution to the ―marketplace of ideas.‖186 By
recognizing that age may be relevant to determining whether school
discipline is justified, however, I do not suggest that minors have no First
Amendment rights at all. The law is clearly to the contrary.187
g. Criticism of School Officials
Where the student has criticized school officials, less deference should
be given to administrators‘ disciplinary decisions.188 When school officials
are criticized, their objectivity is compromised. Furthermore, the student‘s
speech can be considered political and his self-expression may reduce the
frequency of more objectionable behavior. A reviewing court must ensure
that the basis for what might otherwise be punishable conduct is not mere
pretext for the administrator‘s hurt feelings.
h. Experience
Experience with a type of speech is relevant to assess the likelihood and
seriousness of a potential disruption. If similar speech generally has created
disruptions in the past, an administrator‘s prediction of a future disruption
should be considered reasonable.189 Obviously, evidence of the actual
disruption experienced also is relevant.

184. See Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 2008).
185. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988).
186. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996).
187. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396 (2007) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
188. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir. 1992).
189. A prior experience of disruption is most relevant if it occurred at the same school under
similar circumstances. However, administrators and judges may consider prior experiences at other
schools.
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3. Concluding Thoughts About the Proposed Balancing Test for
Speech Under School Supervision
As with any balancing test, there will be fact patterns where the relevant
factors may be difficult to apply, and results may be unpredictable. For
example, is disciplining a student for an anti-homosexuality message
content-neutral or content-based when the speech is found to violate a
school policy requiring civility? Does discipline silence a political or
religious message, or is the student‘s message just a gratuitous attack on
particular individuals? Does the speech violate the fundamental value in
tolerance of others, or does it further the fundamental value in morality?
In cases of doubt, deference should be given to the findings of school
administrators,190 at least where the discipline is not viewpoint-based.
School officials are in a better position to evaluate the effects of a student‘s
speech, and de novo review of officials‘ decisions could create a flood of
litigation. Open-ended balancing with deference to administrators should
discourage much litigation because administrators‘ qualified immunity will
preclude a damages award in all but the worst cases.191 Deference,
however, is not abdication.192 The courts need to protect against the worst
cases of abuse to prevent creation of a totalitarian state and to teach
students about the value of their constitutional rights. Moreover, the extent
of deference suggested is only legitimate if, as is also recommended,
students have full First Amendment rights when not under school
supervision. Only under those circumstances do students truly have
alternate channels of communication open and can the suggested balancing
be justified under the First Amendment.193
D. Classifying Speech as Outside or Under School Supervision when
There Are Elements of Both
Under the proposed comprehensive approach to school speech cases, it
is critical to distinguish speech under school supervision from speech
outside school supervision. Unfortunately, in today‘s technological age,
that distinction is not self-defining, and cases often have both on-campus
and off-campus elements. For example, a defamatory Web posting may be
created at home but accessed at school.
Based upon analogies to more traditional communication methods, this
Article recommends that student speech should be classified as under
school supervision when the student‘s conduct that is the basis for

190. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982) (―The Court has long recognized
that local school boards have broad discretion in the management of school affairs. . . . [Court
precedent] reaffirmed that . . . federal courts should not ordinarily ‗intervene in the resolution of
conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems.‘‖); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 681–82 (1977).
191. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
192. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864.
193. See supra note 104.
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discipline occurred under school supervision.194 If the challenged conduct
is the act of creating a Web posting, the relevant inquiry is where the
posting was created. If the challenge is to the message‘s posting, where and
under what circumstances the message was published determine whether
the message should be considered communicated under school supervision.
Of course, even if one concludes that the challenged behavior occurred
under school supervision, discipline would not be appropriate unless the
speech caused a substantial disruption or was otherwise subject to
discipline under applicable Supreme Court precedent.195 A few examples
can illustrate.
If a student created a lewd Internet profile of the school principal on
MySpace using his home computer that is accessed by the principal at
school, the student‘s speech should be considered outside school
supervision. The site‘s creation clearly occurred outside school
supervision. The communication should not be considered on-campus
because the student did not communicate it under school supervision.
Access by others who are on campus alone cannot be sufficient to consider
a computer posting published under school supervision. In the computer
age, too much can be accessed from school. Letters to the editor of the New
York Times or short stories in magazines can be accessed from school. For
that matter, the principal‘s reading of the posting at school entails no more
school involvement than if the student wrote a letter to the New York Times
and the principal read the letter when he took the Times to his office. Thus,
even if the site caused a substantial disruption at the school, discipline
would not be appropriate. To consider the student as having published a
site under school supervision, the student should have to access the site at
school and show others or tell others to access the site while they are at
school. If the site were published under school supervision, it would be
subject to discipline under Fraser because it was lewd, whether or not
there was a substantial disruption.
If the same profile was created while at school, the message could not
be directly disciplined unless the student also made the publication at
school. However, discipline could be justified for the creation of the profile
if the student made unauthorized use of school computers or Web
resources not open to the general public.196 Schools should have the right
to control the use of their property that does not function as a public
forum,197 and they could adopt any rule for its use, including a rule
194. If a student advocates others to engage in punishable activity while they are at school, the
student should be considered under school supervision as a co-conspirator regardless of where the
advocacy took place. Cf. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 828–29 (7th Cir. 1998) (vacating
preliminary injunction of student‘s expulsion after the student authored an article in an underground
newspaper describing how to hack into the school‘s computer and encouraging others to do so).
195. See supra notes 25–74 and accompanying text.
196. The creation of the profile obviously could be subject to discipline if the student
improperly took class time to create the profile. See Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799–
800 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
197. If government property is a public forum, then the state‘s right to limit private speech is
―‗sharply circumscribed.‘‖ Gold v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 632 F. Supp. 2d 771, 786
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precluding use of school computers to create anything that is likely to
cause a substantial disruption at school. In this way, the school might
indirectly discipline the student‘s message.
Discipline for unauthorized use of school computers or improperly
taking class time to create a site is justified as legitimate conduct, not
speech, regulation. If a student created the site on his own laptop during
recess, there would be no basis for disciplining the creation of the site.
Even though the creation would be considered under school supervision,
the mere creation would not have caused a substantial disruption or
otherwise fall within Supreme Court precedents. These results correspond
to the results of similar student conduct without the use of a computer. If a
student writes a note to transmit to another, the student could be
disciplined for wasting class time or for the content of the note if it was
communicated. No discipline would be appropriate if it was created during
recess and not communicated. Continuing with this analogy,
communications that are created and received instantaneously, such as
instant messages or phone calls, should be treated like the sent note (or inschool conversation)—the creation and communication should be
considered under school supervision.198
III. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION TO LOWER COURT CASES
This Article‘s comprehensive approach to student speech cases is best
illustrated by reviewing some of the most recent reported lower court
cases.
A. Layshock v. Hermitage School District199
In Layshock, a high school student created a parody profile of the
school principal on the website MySpace from his grandmother‘s house
during non-school hours.200 The profile was arguably vulgar, emphasizing
the principal‘s large size.201 As part of the profile, the student posted a
photograph of the principal taken from the school district‘s website.202
―[W]ord of the profile ‗spread like wildfire‘ and soon reached most, if not
all,‖ of the student body.203 On December 15, the student accessed the
profile during his Spanish class and showed it to some of his classmates.204
On another occasion, a teacher had to tell a group of students who were

(M.D. Tenn. 2009) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995); Perry Educ. Ass‘n v. Perry Local Educators‘ Ass‘n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
198. Of course, the recipient also might be subject to discipline for engaging in instant
messaging or accepting a phone call during inappropriate times.
199. 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
200. Id. at 252.
201. Id. at 252–53.
202. Id. at 252.
203. Id. at 253.
204. Id.
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congregating around a computer and giggling to close the parody down.205
A number of teachers called the co-principal on December 15 to report that
students wanted to discuss the profile during class.206 Administrators were
not able to block students from accessing the site because the technology
coordinator was on vacation.207 Instead, the school precluded student use
of computers except in the computer lab and library where the students
could be supervised.208 On December 21, the school learned the name of
the student who created the profile.209 Without prompting from anyone, the
student apologized to the principal for creating the profile, and his parents
punished him.210 At the beginning of the following year, the school district
held an informal hearing after which it disciplined the student.211
Analysis of the above fact pattern under this Article‘s approach would
begin with identifying what speech and conduct occurred under school
supervision. The creation of the website parody and the copying of the
principal‘s photo did not occur on campus and therefore would be subject
to full First Amendment rights. The student‘s access of the site at school
combined with his showing it to some of his classmates constituted speech
under school supervision. Access by other students on campus alone
should not be attributed to the disciplined student.
The speech outside school supervision does not fall under any
exception to First Amendment protection and therefore would be protected
speech. The speech under school supervision was properly disciplined if it
could be considered ―lewd, vulgar and offensive‖ under Fraser or to have
created a ―substantial disruption‖ under Tinker.212 The website might be
considered lewd, vulgar, and offensive,213 and accordingly, its publication
on campus properly would be subject to discipline. If Fraser did not apply,
it would be necessary to decide if the school district had properly found
205. Id.
206. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff‟d, 593
F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
207. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 254.
210. Id.
211. Id. As punishment, the student was (1) placed in the Alternative Educational Program, a
program ―typically reserved for students with behavior and attendance problems who are unable to
function in a regular classroom,‖ for the rest of the year; (2) banned from all extracurricular
activities; and (3) prohibited from participating in his graduation ceremony. Id. at 254. ―Prior to
creating the Myspace profile, Justin was classified as a gifted student, was enrolled in advance
placement classes, and had won awards at interscholastic academic competitions.‖ Id. at 254 n.6.
212. The speech could not be attributed to the school and did not advocate illegal conduct.
Therefore, Kuhlmeier and Morse have no application.
213. The district court so found but ruled for the plaintiff because the website was created off
campus. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 599–600 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff‟d,
593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 07-4465, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7362 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010). The court did not view the student‘s publication of the
speech on campus as subjecting the speech to Fraser‘s standard. Id.
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that the sharing of the website with other students during Spanish class
created a substantial disruption. Given that the website was accessed
during class, the speech could be viewed as affecting curricular matters, for
which school discretion is at its greatest. Regulation of the speech does not
seem to be viewpoint-based, although it might be thought of as contentbased. Nonetheless, the discipline did not threaten political institutions—
the speech was a sophomoric attempt at humor and not a critique of the
government or its officials. In plaintiff‘s favor is that the speech did not
affect the rights of other students,214 and the student and his audience were
relatively old. Also, the speech did insult a school administrator. As such,
there is a greater risk that the alleged basis of the discipline is a pretext for
revenge. The risk is not as great as it could be where, as here, the insulted
administrator was not responsible for the disciplinary decision. However,
objectivity still may be compromised by a desire to protect and defend
subordinates or others with whom the decisionmaker regularly works. The
severity of the punishment given the extent of disruption might make a
court particularly sensitive to the objectivity of the decisionmaker.
Accessing a website and showing it to others during class certainly has the
potential to cause a substantial disruption. It appears, however, that the
teacher was unaware of the student‘s behavior,215 and it is unclear whether
other students were actually disturbed. There is little question that the need
to limit use of the computers and to respond to student demands to talk
about the site during class could be considered a ―substantial disruption.‖
The issue would be whether that disruption was the result of the site‘s
creation or the publication at school. Given the difficulty in making this
determination, this Article would presume it was the result of the student‘s
on-campus conduct unless the student could prove otherwise. The
student‘s protection is simply not to access the site or show others at
school. Ultimately, the decision to discipline the student in Layshock
should have been found constitutional.216 The on-campus publication had
little value; the student could adequately express himself by creation of the
site and its sharing outside school supervision; the speech was vulgar and
did create some disruption; and the school district‘s decision should be
given some deference as it was not viewpoint-based. While troubled by the
extent and appropriateness of the discipline given the violation and the
prior history of the student, those concerns are more fittingly reviewed
under a due process or equal protection analysis.217

214. The speech obviously affected the principal, but the principal cannot be viewed as
vulnerable, and the school does not have a custodial responsibility to the principal.
215. Layshock, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
216. The district court found that there was not a substantial disruption, and the school district
did not appeal that ruling. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 260–61.
217. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Such challenges might be especially attractive given
that there were three other more vulgar websites that went unpunished. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 253–
54.
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B. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District218
J.S., a fourteen-year-old eighth grader, and a friend of hers created a
fictitious profile of her principal on MySpace using her parents‘ home
computer.219 The profile did not state the principal‘s name but used a
photograph of him taken from the school district‘s website.220 The profile
contained profanity-laced statements insinuating that the principal was a
sex addict and pedophile.221 J.S. created the profile as a joke and because
she was mad at the principal due to the way he treated her for an earlier
dress code violation.222 The day after the profile was created, several
students approached J.S. at school and told her they found the site funny.223
That evening, J.S. made the profile ―private‖ limiting access to twenty-two
other students who were given friends status.224 Two teachers had to quiet
their classes when students talked about the profile.225 The school
computers block access to MySpace, so students could only view the site
from an off-campus location.226 After meeting with the students and their
parents, the principal suspended J.S. and her friend for ten days.227 The
enraged principal also threatened legal action and contacted the police.228
Two students decorated the offending students‘ lockers welcoming them
back to school following their suspension.229
Under this Article‘s proposed approach, the school discipline was
unconstitutional. All of J.S.‘s and her friend‘s challenged actions took
place outside school supervision.230 The principal, however, might pursue
claims of criminal harassment or defamation.231
If the speech in J.S. had occurred on campus, it would certainly have
been subject to discipline under Fraser. If it had occurred on campus,
whether the speech could be disciplined under Tinker would be a close
question. The analysis would be similar to that described above for
Layshock.232 Obviously, since the speech occurring on campus is merely
hypothetical, it is impossible to know the location of the speech or the
disruption that the speech itself (as opposed to the website‘s creation)
caused. Although the students‘ relatively young age would militate in favor
218. 593 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2010), reh‟g en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 08-4138, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
219. Id. at 290–91.
220. Id. at 291.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 291–92.
223. Id. at 292.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 293.
226. Id. at 292.
227. Id. at 293.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 294.
230. The court of appeals upheld the school discipline applying Tinker to ―off-campus speech
that causes or reasonably threatens to cause a substantial disruption.‖ Id. at 301.
231. Id. at 301–02 & n.9.
232. See supra notes 199–216 and accompanying text.
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of discipline, deference would be limited given that the original
decisionmaker was the very person who had been defamed.
C. Mardis v. Hannibal Public School District233
In Mardis, the plaintiff student was chatting via instant messages on a
private computer with a friend outside of school hours.234 In that October
24, 2006, conversation, the plaintiff told his friend that he was going to get
a gun and kill certain classmates.235 The friend responded with
encouragement and laughter, suggesting that ―the [p]laintiff should shoot
all of the black women because ‗[t]he death of a black person cracks me
up.‘‖236 Nonetheless, within hours, the friend forwarded the plaintiff‘s
message to school administrators.237 The police arrested the plaintiff on
charges of making those threats, and upon order of the juvenile court, he
was admitted to a hospital‘s psychiatric ward.238 Upon release from the
hospital on October 30, 2006, the plaintiff was returned to the juvenile
court and remained in juvenile detention through February 9, 2007.239 On
October 31, 2006, the day following the plaintiff‘s release from the
psychiatric ward, the school district suspended the plaintiff for ten days.240
On November 3, 2006, the district‘s superintendent extended the plaintiff‘s
suspension through the end of the school year.241 As a result of the
plaintiff‘s threat, the school was inundated with calls from concerned
parents and forced to significantly increase its security.242
According to the approach recommended by this Article, the
superintendent properly suspended the plaintiff in Mardis. The student‘s
communications were entirely outside school supervision and, therefore,
were entitled to the same First Amendment protection as a non-student.
Nonetheless, even under normal First Amendment standards, the plaintiff‘s
speech was properly considered a true threat. There was some indication
that the plaintiff‘s friend interpreted the plaintiff‘s threats as a joke.243
However, given the friend‘s immediate report of the threat, the police
arrest, and hospital commitment, the school administrators‘ conclusion that
the plaintiff communicated ―a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence‖244 had more than adequate support.245
233. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Mo. 2010).
234. Id. at 1115.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1121.
237. Id. at 1119.
238. Id. at 1115.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1116.
242. Id. at 1123–24.
243. Id. at 1121.
244. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
245. The court in Mardis upheld the school‘s discipline both as a ―true threat‖ and under
Tinker‘s ―substantial disruption‖ standard. Mardis, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, 1124. This Article‘s
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CONCLUSION
Student speech cases dominate courts‘ First Amendment dockets.
Confusion seems to be the rule. This Article has recommended a
comprehensive approach to such cases that is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and best balances students‘, schools‘, and the public‘s
interests. When student speech occurs outside of school supervision, the
speech should receive the same First Amendment protection as a nonstudent‘s speech. Speech outside school supervision does not implicate the
―essential characteristics‖ of the school environment that justify special
First Amendment treatment of student speech. Providing full First
Amendment protection to off-campus speech also has the benefit of clarity.
Moreover, by giving students full protection for such speech, one can
justify tighter restrictions of on-campus speech where school regulation is
most necessary. With alternate channels of communication open,
regulation of on-campus speech obviously raises fewer First Amendment
concerns.
When student speech occurs under school supervision, great deference
should be given to administrators‘ disciplinary decisions, especially when
not viewpoint-based. Constant review is undesirable and, with alternate
channels of expression available, is generally unnecessary. Many
restrictions on First Amendment rights are simply required for a school to
run efficiently. Nonetheless, deference cannot justify abdication.
Unregulated restrictions of student speech, particularly with mandatory
attendance laws, can lead to a totalitarian state. Under Supreme Court
precedent, speech on campus can be regulated if it is lewd, advocates drug
use, bears the school‘s imprimatur, or is likely to create a ―substantial
disruption‖ on campus. This Article has identified a number of factors for
courts to consider when determining whether speech is likely to cause a
substantial disruption. Although not always self-defining, the
recommended factors can reduce the amount of ad hoc decisionmaking and
best balance the respective interests involved in student speech regulation.

proposal would find the latter holding erroneous as the student‘s conduct occurred entirely outside
school supervision.
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